RIVERS  AND  HARBORS. 


SPEECH 


OF 


HON.  CLIFTON  R.  BRECKINRIDGE, 


OF  ARKANSAS, 


IN  THE 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES, 


Tuesday,  February  3,  1885. 


WASHINGTON. 

1885. 


SPEECH 


OF 


HON.  CLIFTON  R.  BRECKINRIDGE. 


The  House  being  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  the  state  of  the  Union,  and 
having  under  consideration  the  bill  (H.  R.  8130)  making  appropriations  for  the 
construction,  repair,  and  preservation  of  certain  public  works  on  rivers  and  har- 
bors, and  for  other  purposes — 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE  said: 

Mr.  Chairman:  When  the  river  and  harbor  bill  was  reported  to  the 
House  I gave  notice  of  my  intention  to  bring  in  a minority  report.  I 
have  been  unable  to  write  out  that  report;  but  in  the  course  of  my  re- 
marks I will  bring  before  the  House  the  propositions  it  would  contain. 
I did  not  contemplate  a dissent  from  anything  in  the  bill  reported  by 
the  committee,  but  an  addition  to  the  bill. 

The  committee  made  no  appropriations  for  harbors  upon  the  Missis- 
sippi River  below  Cairo.  They  made  a proportionable  appropriation 
for  the  river  below  Cairo  as  a unit;  but  they  left  out  those  additional 
recommendations  of  the  commission  for  the  respective  harbors  to  which 
I refer. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  people  of  this  country,  and 
especially  to  those  north  of  Cairo,  that  the  unity  of  the  plan  of  treating 
the  river  should  not  be  interfered  with.  This  is  enforced  from  every 
source.  If  the  appropriations  are  broken  up  into  disconnected  parts  it 
destroys  all  continuous  and  contiguous  treatment  of  the  river.  This, 
I say,  can  not  be  permitted  by  the  great  States  north,  east,  or  west  of 
Cairo.  The  House  knows  very  well  that  the  river  below  Cairo  is  not 
being  improved  for  the  benefit  of  the  sparse  population  upon  its  banks, 
but  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley,  of  which  the  lower 
part  is  the  least  part.  There  are,  however,  certain  cities  of  commercial 
importance  situated  upon  the  banks  of  the  lower  river,  and  it  can  not 
be  expected  that  the  commercial  interests  centering  at  these  points  will 
be  wholly  unmindful  of  their  own  necessities  and  rights. 

But  the  proposition  has  been  brought  forward  that  these  ports  are  not 
harbors  in  the  usual  and  commercial  sense.  This  can  never  be  agreed 
to.  Over  against  it  I lay  the  maintained  policy  of  Congress  in  cases 
almost  without  number.  The  position  of  the  committee  is  illogical, 
unusual,  unjust,  and  unfortunate. 

It  was  only  last  year  that  an  appropriation  was  made  for  the  Mis- 
souri River  as  a river.  Before  that  the  appropriations  were  for  the  im- 
provement exclusively  of  the  harbors  upon  that  river;  and  all  along  the 
line  of  Congressional  action  we  have  these  appropriations  for  the  interior 
harbors  of  the  country. 

I consider,  sir,  that  a harbor  like  that  at  the  city  of  Memphis  has  a 
stronger  claim  upon  Congress  for  attention  than  even  those  upon  our 
seaboard.  For  instance,  take  the  harbof  at  New  York.  The  improve- 


4 


ments  there  enter  in  no  wise  into  the  general  plan  of  improvement  to 
connect  the  Atlantic  Ocean  with  Albany,  while,  on  the  contrary,  an 
appropriation  for  the  improvement  of  these  harbors  upon  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  I cite  again  the  Memphis  Harbor,  are  appropriations  for  im- 
provements that  will  in  all  human  probability,  in  due  time,  be  links  in 
the  general  system  of  the  river  improvement.  There  is  not  a dollar 
expended  nor  a lick  of  work  done  that  is  not  expended  and  done  where 
only  general  river  improvement  is  carried  on.  It  all  would  be  done 
here  in  time  anyway.  The  only  question  is,  shall  we  do  it  a little 
quicker  than  we  would  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events  ? And  yet  in 
the  face  of  a settled  question  and  in  the  face  of  this  peculiar  strength 
gentlemen  hesitate.  And  why  ? 

They  say  that  in  due  time  the  general  river  improvement  will  cover 
th!e  case.  This  is  true;  but  this  is  selfish  in  our  Northern  friends  to 
make  us  wait  and  suffer  until  we  are  relieved  only  as  a tardy  incident 
to  their  relief. 

They  say  that  such  improvements  would  benefit  private  property. 
That  is  true;  but  if  that  is  an  unavoidable  incident  in  the  discharge  of 
our  bounden  duty,  should  it  grieve  us?  Why  should  that  confuse  our 
minds  ? I know  the  doctrine  of  riparian  rights  and  risks.  It  is  sound. 
But  there  is  another  question  in  this  case.  This  is  not  a river  landing, 
where  a planter  hauls  cotton  from  his  gin-house  a few  hours  before  the 
steamboat  is  due.  This  is  the  city  to  which  he  ships.  This  is  the  city 
to  which  not  only  he  ships,  but  also  to  which  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  other  people  in  the  interior  and  among  the  uplands  and  mountains 
ship  their  produce,  and  from  which  they  get  their  merchandise  and 
manufactured  goods  of  all  kinds. 

Here  are  the  railroad  centers.  Here  are  the  warehouses,  the  cotton 
compresses,  the  paved  wharfs,  the  railroad  inclines,  and  all  the  other 
needs  and  appurtenances  of  commerce.  If  these  are  destroyed  the  peo- 
ple who  own  them^  are  losers.  There  is  no  doubt  about  that.  But  is 
no  one  else  a loser?  Is  commerce  not  affected  by  the  broad  funda- 
mental fact  that  it  can  no  longer  have  a port  here?  It  must  either 
stand  in  its  charges  the  expense  of  these  risks  or  else  it  must  go  by  rail 
to  distant  ports  where  stability  is  found,  and  of  course  that  makes  an 
equal  charge  upon  the  commerce.  This  may  suit  the  railroads,  but  it 
will  not  pay  the  farmers  and  merchants.  Who  can  gainsay  this? 

It  is  questionable  whether  Congress  would  sit  still  and  see  a city  like 
Memphis,  the  second  city  of  the  South,  for  Louisville  is  hardly  South- 
ern, plunge  headlong  into  the  Mississippi  River  and  be  lost  forever. 
As  a case  of  urgency  and  distress  the  American  heart  would  respond  to 
it.  Who  would  say  no?  We  would  curb  the  great  river  that  we  only 
have  charge  of  and  save  the  happy  homes  of  75,000  people. 

But  we  do  not  need  to  go  to  this.  This  is  not  like  a plantation  landing. 
The  landing  may  be  swept  away  and  the  planter  would  want  only  a 
landing  still.  The  untouched  river  bank  is  all  he  wants.  But  here 
are  certain  great  centers,  scattered  over  a thousand  miles  of  river,  and 
commerce  must  find  stability  there  for  its  assembled  needs,  or  else  the 
thousands  must  pay  tribute  to  less  fortuitous  conditions.  The  river  is 
but  little  to  these  people  if  they  can  not  do  business  upon  its  banks.  I 
appeal  to  you  then,  gentlemen  from  the  North,  not  to  see  only  your  own 
interests,  not  to  disregard  these  righteous  claims,  and  not  to  provoke 
a desperate  struggle  between  yourselves  and  the  commercial  interests 
of  the  lower  States. 

And  now  there  are  two  other  points  that  I want  to  speak  about  as 


5 


briefly  as  I can.  In  the  first  place  I wish  to  speak  of  a few  engineering 
features  in  connection  with  the  Galveston  Harbor  improvement.  As 
is  known  by  this  House  we  propose  to  throw  overboard  work  there  that 
has  cost  nearly  $2,000,000,  or  at  least  what  little  is  left  of  it,  and  to 
change  the  entire  management  of  the  work  at  that  place.  This  is  a very 
grave  reflection  upon  the  military  engineers  who  have  charge  of  this 
work,  and  there  must  be  very  grave  reasons  for  so  radical  a step.  I am 
one  of  those  who  believe  that  reasons  exist  not  only  sufficient  to  justify 
the  proposed  step  but  sufficient  to  make  it  absolutely  obligatory  upon  us. 

The  Government  work  was  begun  there  ten  years  ago.  The  survey 
and  plans  are  given  in  the  report  of  1874.  At  an  expenditure  of  sev- 
eral hundred  thousand  dollars  a jetty  of  gabions  was  extended  from 
what  is  known  as  Bolivar  Point  into  the  Gulf.  General  Newton  fig- 
ures it  out  in  his  letter  to  our  committee  that  this  gabionnade  cost 
$169,000.  Senator  Coke,  in  the  very  able  report  he  made  to  the  Sen- 
ate on  behalf  of  the  Commerce  Committee  of  that  body,  figures  the  cost 
at  $527,000.  It  is  not  easy  from  the  Engineer’s  report  to  fix  the  exact 
amount;  but  I have  figured  it  up  twice,  and  it  is  certain,  if  the  reports 
be  correct,  that  General  Newton  is  far  too  low,  and  I am  very  much 
inclined  to  think  that  Senator  Coke  is  too  low. 

It  was  expected,  as  you  will  see  on  page  867  of  report  of  1875  and 
on  page  447  of  report  of  1877,  that  this  north  jetty  would  secure  the 
desired  depth  of  water  there.  However,  nature  has  rebuked  the  dis- 
regard of  her  laws  and  the  gabionnade  is  gone.  There  is  not  a vestige 
of  the  structure  left.  This  was  not  due  to  quicksand  or  to  any  such 
cause.  The  gabions  were  no  account  to  begin  with,  and  had  they  been 
strong  they  would  have  been  lost  just  the  same.  They  exemplified  what 
is  known  as  the  submerged  jetty,  a novel  species  of  structure  that  we 
are  largely  engaged  in  and  with  apparently  no  earthly  sign  of  stability 
or  success. 

I have  taken  occasion,  sir,  to  read  the  accounts  of  all  the  sea  works 
in  the  world  on  the  jetty  plan  that  I could  find,  and  I have  a long  list 
of  them,  and  never  was  there  any  work  of  that  kind  undertaken,  nor, 
indeed,  was  it  ever  suggested  that  I have  been  able  to  learn  except  once. 
The  single  suggestion  that  I speak  of  was  in  the  course  of  the  consul- 
tations of  engineers  and  others  with  reference  to  the  improvement  of 
the  mouth  of  the  Danube.  Sir  Charles  Hartley,  the  engineer  in  charge, 
stated  that  the  plan  of  submerged  jetties  was  “actually  proposed  to  the 
commission  by  one  of  its  technical  advisers.”  It  permitted  the  very 
force  you  propose  to  conserve  to  be  dispersed  and  lost,  for  your  only 
hope  of  power  is  in  controlling  the  surface  slope,  which  controls  the 
currents  at  all  depths,  and  they  would  serve  no  other  purpo’se  than 
that  of  “dangerous  submarine  reefs.” 

I respectfully  refer  those  who  may  not  have  read  the  interesting  paper 
I quote  from  to  page  287,  volume  21,  Proceedings  Institution  Civil  En- 
gineers, London,  to  be  found  in  the  national  library. 

That  plan  was  adopted  at  Galveston  by  what  is  known  as  the  gabi- 
onnade system.  What  is  a gabion?  A gabion  is  nothing  but  a huge 
lunch  basket  that  is  cemented  on  the  outside  as  you  cement  the  inside 
of  a cistern,  and  that  basket  is  filled  with  sand,  is  put  in  position,  and 
was  supposed  to  be  irresistible  to  storms.  These  gabions  did  resist  the 
storms,  so  far  as  being  broken  up  is  concerned,  much  better  than  they 
resisted  some  of  the  other  effects  of  the  storms  and  the  effects  of  tidal 
currents.  Being  submerged,  and  the  tides  and  waves  sweeping  over 
them  with  a dangerous  overfall  current,  they  were  undermined.  Foot- 


6 


mats  did  not  save  them.  The  conclusion  is  well  stated  in  the  report  of 
1880,  page  1226,  where  it  says : “ In  fact,  thegabionnadehas  essentially 
gone  down  below  the  original  bottom.” 

And  so  they  are  gone,  and  that  folly  has  not  even  its  monument  left. 
That  would  seem  to  have  demonstrated  the  futility  of  putting  down 
submerged  j etties,  for  this  submerged  j etty  was  not  undermined  because 
it  had  the  name  of  ‘ ‘ gabionnade.  ’ ’ No  other  name  would  have  saved  it. 

In  1880  a new  method  of  construction  was  adopted.  Captain  Howell 
was  replaced  with  Major  Mansfield,  the  present  officer  in  charge.  What 
is  known  as  the  fascine  system,  a partial  copy  of  the  Dutch  works  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Maas, was  adopted.  But  the  copy  is  like  “Hamlet  with 
Hamlet  left  out.”  The  Dutch  works  are  high.  These  are  to  be  sub- 
merged. The  Maas  has  silt  to  protect  the  fascines.  These  have  no  hope 
of  mud  to  protect  them  from  the  teredo,  a most  destructive  sea- worm. 
And  as  for  gathering  sand,  our  last  submerged  jetty  did  not  collect 
sand,  as  expected.  It  was  left  “standing  in  a trench  without  sand.” 
How  can  this  fare  better  when  it  is  substantially  the  same  shape  and 
height  ? They  seem  to  be  repeating  in  principle,  though  in  a little  dif- 
ferent form,  the  same  error  that  was  committed  before. 

Over  $1,000,000  has  been  put  out  on  this  new  work,  and  the  people 
of  Texas  continued  to  pin  their  hope  to  the  plan.  That  has  gone  on, 
sir,  until  it  has  been  projected  now  some  four  and  a quarter  miles  into 
the  Gulf.  All  the  prophecies  with  reference  to  it  have  failed. 

There  were  plenty  of  prophecies  of  what  would  be  the  result  of  the 
present  j etty  at  the  different  stages  of  its  progress — prophecies  of  depth, 
of  durability,  and  all  that.  I will  treat  of  these  more  particularly  later 
on.  The  people  of  Galveston  put  $100,000  of  their  own  money  into  the 
work.  But  after  severe  disappointments  and  about  nine  years  of  trial 
they  threw  up  the  case,  and  last  session  the  entire  delegation  from  Texas, 
a delegation  conspicuous  for  its  ability  and  high  character,  told  us  frankly 
that  further  work  upon  this  system  was  in  their  opinion  a waste  of  time 
and  money. 

Now  the  question  is,  have  we  enough  to  satisfy  us  ? But  we  must 
go  further  in  our  examination  of  the  work  and  of  the  men  who  have 
control  of  it.  This  will  help  us  to  come  to  a right  conclusion  as  to 
whether  one  or  both  should  be  put  aside.  Judging  as  laymen,  we 
must  be  largely  influenced  by  our  confidence  in  the  men.  I will  call 
attention  to  some  of  the  statements  of  the  engineers. 

You  will  find,  sir,  in  the  printed  remarks  of  my  colleague  on  the  com- 
mittee, General  Bayne,  of  Pennsylvania,  a letter  from  Colonel  Mer- 
rill, an  officer  of  the  military  Engineer  Corps,  and  who  seems  now  to 
be  a spokesman  in  this  matter. 

Colonel  Merrill  states  that  both  the  Chief  of  Engineers  and  the  resi- 
dent engineer  deny  that  the  north  jetty  has  yet  been  located. 

Now,  in  reference  to  that,  I want  to  call  the  attention  of  the  House 
to  page  1225  of  the  report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  for  1880.  It  reads: 

From  its  commencement,  April  14, 1877,  to  January  1, 1880,  the  Bolivar  pier — 

Which  is  the  north  one — 
had  been  extended  seaward  from  the  beach  10,220  feet. 

Now  that  statement  is  signed  by  General  Newton  himself,  the  pres- 
ent Chief  of  Engineers,  who  is  quoted  by  Colonel  Merrill  as  denying 
that  this  jetty  has  ever  been  located. 

I can  not  comprehend,  Mr.  Chairman,  how  about  two  miles  of  this 
north  jetty  could  be  built,  running  through  nearly  three  years,  without 


7 


having  been  located.  Nor  can  I understand  how  such  a statement  as 
has  been  presented  to  us  can  be  thus  solemnly  certified  to  Congress  for 
its  guidance.  Was  anybody  cashiered  or  complained  of  for  that  im- 
mense expenditure  of  the  public  funds  in  an  unauthorized  way  ? No,  sir; 
and  there  was  no  occasion  to  do  it,  for  it  was  on  an  accepted  line.  I 
have  quoted  from  the  last  report  of  the  board  of  engineers,  and  if  you 
will  look  at  their  first  report,  in  1874,  you  will  see  that  they  therein 
make  revised  estimates  for  both  the  north  and  south  jetty  projected  to- 
ward the  outer  bar,  and  they  raise  Captain  Howell’s  estimate  $635,- 
401.50,  making  the  total  $1,759,401.85,  instead  of  $1,124,000.35.  The 
chart  is  referred  to  as  showing  the  “ parallel  jetties,”  and  the  board 
takes  no  exception  to  that  location,  nor  does  it  suggest  any  change. 
This  report  also  is  signed  by  General  Newton  himself.  It  is  in  the  face 
of  these  facts  and  of  many  more  like  them,  running  all  through  the  re- 
ports, that  ‘ ‘ both  the  Chief  of  Engineers  and  the  engineer  in  charge 
deny  that  the  north  jetty  has  ever  been  located.” 

I will  call  attention  to  one  other  proof.  Here  is  the  chart  with  the 
report  of  1880.  It  is  the  official  map  of  the  engineer  in  charge,  Colonel 
Mansfield,  with  his  signature  upon  it,  and  it  is  under  these  words: 
“Showing  lines  of  proposed  jetties.”  This  chart  is  sent  to  Congress 
by  the  then  Chief  of  Engineers,  and  it  is  in  Colonel  Mansfield’s  report 
dated  July  17,  1880,  just  thirty-seven  days  after  the  report  of  the  board, 
of  which  General  Newton  was  a member,  and  which  gave  advice  to  the 
Engineering  Department  to  help  it  to  a final  conclusion.  After  it  has 
been  all  digested  we  have  this  map,  which  the  Chief  of  Engineers  pub- 
lishes with  his  report  and  without  comment.  Yet  the  north  jetty  is 
not  located.  I shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  this  map  again,  as  well 
as  to  some  of  the  very  ample  statements  in  this  report  about  both  of 
the  jetties. 

Thus  you  see  both  of  these  gentlemen  are  frequently  and  in  the  most 
conspicuous  manner  refuted  by  point-blank  testimony  over  their  own 
signatures. 

Mr.  WHITE,  of  Kentucky.  May  I ask  the  gentleman  from  Arkansas 
[Mr.  Breckinridge]  to  give  the  date  of  that  first  statement? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  The  date  is  not  given,  but  Mr.  Bayne  in- 
troduced it  in  his  speech  here  on  Saturday,  and  its  general  tenor  indi- 
cates that  it  has  been  written  quite  recently. 

Mr.  J^AYNE.  I think  you  will  find  that  it  bears  the  date  of  January 
21,  1885. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  It  is  certainly  in  this  year.  The  date  of 
the  first  statement  from  the  reports  is  several  years  ago,  during  the 
progress  of  the  work. 

Mr.  SPRINGER.  If  I do  not  interrupt  the  gentleman,  I would  like 
to  ask  him  whether,  in  these  comparisons  that  he  is  making,  he  may 
not  be  confusing  the  inner  with  the  outer  harbor? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  No,  sir.  The  north  jetty  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  inner  harbor.  There  is  no  possibility  of  that  construction. 
The  whole  argument  is  predicated  upon  this  plan,  and  here  are  the 
lines  projected  into  the  Gulf  and  drawings  of  cross-sections  and  all  that. 

Now,  there  is  another  statement  made  by  the  engineers,  which  goes 
to  show  how  these  gentlemen  are  dealing  with  this  work,  and  how 
much  confidence  we  can  have  that  they  know  what  they  are  about  or 
that  they  would  ever  do  any  good  there. 

This  statement  is  in  regard  to  the  width  between  jetties.  This  officei 
(Colonel  Merrill)  says  that  the  statement  that  the  width  is  to  be  two 


8 


and  one- fourth  miles  between  the  jetties  is  positively  denied  by  the 
Chief  of  Engineers  and  by  the  resident  engineer.  We  can  only  go  upon 
the  data  given  us  by  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  through  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  sent  here  for  our  guidance. 

Now,  sir,  here  is  this  chart,  indorsed  by  the  final  authority  and  after 
counsel,  and  the  width  is  given.  It  is  no  “study  ” map,  and  is  not  so 
given.  You  see  by  it  that  the  outer  ends  are  12,200  feet  apart,  consid- 
erably more  than  two  and  one-fourth  miles.  The  inner  ends  are  some- 
what wider.  Here  are  the  dividers  [producing  them] , and  I invite  any 
gentleman  to  come  here  and  take  the  measurement  for  himself  and 
look  at  this  chart. 

Again,  it  is  stated  by  this  gentleman  that  the  statement  that  there 
were  to  be  outlets  or  gaps  in  the  jetties  is  entirely  untrue,  that  noth- 
ing of  the  kind  is  mentioned.  He  says,  “ I can  find  no  authority  for 
the  existence  of  these  outlets.  ” I will  only  ask  the  House  to  look  at 
the  printed  statements  on  that  point.  Colonel  Mansfield  states  in  his 
last  report  to  Congress,  which  was  under  the  eye  of  this  engineer,  that 
upon  the  chart  he  has  shown  the  line  of  the  north  jetty — which  of 
course  is  another  place  where  the  north  jetty  is  located.  But  I am  now 
discussing  the  question  of  outlets.  I read  from  part  2,  page  1298,  re- 
port of  1884: 

Upon  the  chart  is  shown  the  line  of  the  north  jetty,  as  I propose.  It  is  to  pro- 
ject from  a point  abreast  the  26-foot  depth  in  Bolivar  Channel  to  25-foot  depth  in 
the  Gulf,  &c. 

Now,  take  the  26-foot  point  in  Bolivar  Channel  and  measure  from  that 
back  to  the  shore,  and  you  will  find  that  it  is  over  6,000  feet  out  from 
the  shore,  leaving  conclusively  a gap  of  largely  over  a mile  in  extent. 
I furthermore  state  that  while  I have  not  seen  the  chart  since  it  was 
sent  to  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  for  our  present  advanced  set  of  the  report 
does  not  contain  it,  yet  I did  see  it  when  I was  in  Galveston  last  fall, 
where  I went  in  compliance  with  a promise  I had  made  to  the  Texas 
delegation  that  I would  go  and  examine  into  their  wants.  When  I was 
in  Galveston  I saw  the  proposed  chart  and  it  showed  a gap  of  apparently 
several  thousand  feet  between  the  shore  and  the  inner  end  of  the  north 
jetty.  But  the  statement  I have  quoted  shows  it,  and  of  course  the 
chart  referred  to  is  in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  and  was  exam- 
ined by  this  officer  as  he  states.  Then  on  page  1414 — report  of  1882— 
the  board  says:  “It  seems  probable  that  they  (the  jetties)  must  be  con- 
nected with  the  shore.”  Do  these  things  indicate  gaps  or  outlets? 

The  next  question  is  as  to  the  height  of  these  jetties.  It  should  be 
remembered  that  all  the  successful  works  of  this  character  in  the  world 
(of  which  there  are  many  instances,  and  some  of  them  over  a hundred 
years  old)  are  jetties  that  are  high  enough  to  conserve  the  flow  which 
they  seek  to  direct  upon  the  bar,  and  they  are  also  high  enough  to  pre- 
vent sand  from  being  transported  over  them  into  the  channel,  and  to 
prevent  their  being  destroyed  by  the  overfall  of  waves  that  would  bur- 
row beneath  them.  It  is  a great  mistake  to  suppose  that  mere  sand 
is  a compressible  base.  The  trouble  with  sand  is  that  it  is  a movable 
base.  In  the  report  of  1880  the  board  say  there  is  no  more  trouble 
here  than  on  the  bars  of  New  England,  that  nibble  would  easily  stand, 
and  they  give  a cut  of  the  shape  it  would  take.  When  the  foolish  man 
built  his  house  upon  the  sand,  he  had  no  trouble  about  the  sinking  of 
the  sand;  it  was  only  when  the  rain  descended  and  the  floods  came 
and  the  winds  blew  and  beat  upon  the  house,  that  it  fell,  and  great 
was  the  tall  thereof — as  was  the  case  with  the  gabions,  and  as  is  the 


9 


case  with  much  of  our  sea- work  at  other  places;  which,  however,  I 
have  not  time  to  go  into  now.  They  deny  that  these  jetties  are  to  be 
submerged.  If  you  will  look  on  page  1229,  report  of  1880,  you  will 
find  these  words: 

It  has  always  been  assumed  that  the  Galveston  jettiee  are  to  be  submerged. 

And  it  goes  on  to  say  that  ‘ ‘ an  average  height  of  five  feet  above  the 
sand”  may  “prove  sufficient.”  This  is  signed  by  General  Newton 
himself. 

Now,  as  for  Major  Mansfield  upon  this  point.  Turn  to  page  1211, 
same  report.  This  language  is  dated  in  July,  about  a month  after  the 
board  had  given  its  counsel,  and  is  sent  to  Congress  in  the  following 
December,  as  the  conclusion  of  things.  It  is  by  Mr.  Ripley,  an  assist- 
ant to  Major  Mansfield.  And  on  page  1206  Major  Mansfield  says  he  is 
indebted  to  him  for  1 * so  clear  and  comprehensive  an  exposition  of  our 
plans. 1 ’ The  report  says : 

The  accompanying  tracings  show  the  form  and  position  of  each  jetty.  The 
south  jetty  * * * commencing  at  the  inner  end  for  4,080  feet  the  top  is  five 
feet  below  the  water.  From  this  point  it  “ slopes  up  to  the  water  surface,”  and 
it  never  does  get  substantially  above  it. 

The  north  jetty  amounts  to  the  same  thing. 

Now,  if  you  want  an  earlier  expression  upon  this  point,  see  page  733, 
part  1,  report  of  1874.  Captain  Howell,  the  officer  in  charge,  says: 

They  maybe  called  submerged  jetties,  since  they  will  not,  except  on  a short 
portion  of  their  lines,  be  built  up  to  the  plane  of  mean  low  tide,  while  for  the 
greater  part  their  tops  will  be  five  or  six  feet  below  that  plane. 

General  Newton  concurred  in  the  report  of  that  year  that  took  no 
exception  to  this,  but  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  the  “ piers  proposed  ” 
were  constructed  the  depth  would  be  increased  “in  an  important  de- 
gree. ” Yet  these  gentlemen  tell  us  that  these  jetties  are  not  to  be  sub- 
merged. Pray,  when  and  where  and  by  whom  have  they  been  changed  ? 
Shall  we  look  to  the  last  report  of  all  ? I mean  the  last  report  of  the 
board.  Then  see  page  1454,  report  of  1882.  It  says: 

We  advise  that  the  jetty  be  almost  if  not  wholly  submerged,  as  originally 
intended  by  Major  Howell. 

And  they  speak  of  no  part  showing  its  head  except  ‘ 1 the  outer  ends.  ” 

This  language  also  is  signed  by  General  Newton,  along  with  the 
other  members  of  that  board.  And  yet  these  gentlemen  in  question, 
who  are  our  presumed  hope,  guides,  and  support — the  ones  that  suffer- 
ing commerce  and  a languishing  State  all  look  to — they  come  and  cer- 
tify such  things  to  us,  as  if  we  would  never  look  up  their  past  reports, 
but  would  go  on  suffering  forever,  and  forever  sustaining  them  with  the 
people’s  millions  in  wretched  experiments  that  the  great  marine  en- 
gineers of  the  world  tell  us  are  but  child’s  play.  It  is  in  vain  for  these 
gentlemen  to  talk  about  this  as  a mere  personal  question,  when  the 
commerce  of  the  country  is  suffering,  or  to  denounce  honorable  mer- 
chants as  “mercenaries,”  or  an  honorable  and  eminent  American  as 
being  allied  with  such  despicable  characters,  when  they  are  failing  in 
argument,  failing  in  works,  and  even  failing  in  statements  of  fact.  I 
have  been  astounded  at  these  proceedings. 

I have  been  astounded  at  seeing  a high  officer  of  the  Government  cer- 
tifying such  gross  inaccuracies  to  Congress,  and  so  far  forgetting  himself 
as  to  indulge  in  billingsgate  and  slander  toward  a man  and  a set  of 
eminent  gentlemen  who  command  the  respect  of  all  who  know  them. 
It  has  frequently  been  remarked  with%s  that  this  at  least  seemed  to 
be  one  project  where  all  the  lobbyists  were  left  out,  much,  apparently, 


10 


to  their  chagrin,  and  only  plain,  honest,  earnest  argument  was  em- 
ployed, headed  by  such  eminent  gentlemen  as  our  chairman  of  the  Com- 
merce Committee  [Mr.  Reagan]  and  the  other  able  and  distinguished 
members  from  Texas  and  the  eminent  Senators  from  that  State,  a dele- 
gation, as  a whole,  that  is  an  honor  to  our  country. 

And  now,  sir,  I come  to  another  feature  that  has  lessened  my  confi- 
dence in  the  present  administration  of  this  work,  and  which  helped  to 
make  me  conclude  that  we  need  to  employ  some  one  else  if  we  do  not 
mean  to  mock  the  sufferings  of  2, 000, 000  of  people.  On  page  217,  part 
1 of  the  last  report,  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  General  Newton,  says  the 
estimate  of  1880  “contemplated  the  obtainment  of  a channel  across 
the  outer  bar  of  at  least  twenty-jive  feet  deep.  ’ ’ The  last  words  are  in 
italics.  Now,  sir,  there  are  two  reports  from  the  board  in  1880,  and 
both  of  them  are  signed  by  General  Newton.  One  is  dated  New  York, 
June  7,  of  that  year;  and  on  page  1221  of  the  report  of  1880  you  find  it 
stated  that  the  project  they  had  been  working  under,  with  Major  Howell 
in  charge,  contemplated  ‘ 4 deepening  the  outer  or  Gulf  bar  from  twelve 
to  eighteen  feet,  possibly.  ’ ’ No  other  contemplated  depth  is  mentioned 
in  the  report  of  the  board. 

The  other  reports  are  the  same  way.  Where  then  does  the  Chief  of 
Engineers  get  his  authority  for  making  that  statement  to  Congress  ? As 
a member  of  the  board  he  has  uniformly  stated  the  contrary.  There 
is,  however,  a place  where  he  gets  it,  and  it  carries  a moral  with  it.  You 
will  find  on  page  1214,  report  of  1880,  a statement  by  Major  Mansfield’s 
assistant,  Mr.  Ripley,  regarding  the  effect  of  the  jetties  he  proposes. 
He  says:  “We  should  look  with  confidence  for  an  extreme  depth  of  not 
less  than  twenty-five  feet.”  This  is  the  only  place  in  all  the  reports, 
from  the  beginning  in  1873  down  to  this  time,  where  any  such  mention 
is  made.  But  General  Newton  says,  on  page  8,  in  his  letter  to  our  com- 
mittee, that  ‘ ‘ these  reports  have  no  other  value  save  the  authority  of 
their  authors.  ’ ’ He  further  says  that  they  are  ‘ ‘ without  any  sanction 
from  the  proper  authority.”  Is  the  prophecy  of  this  humble  assistant 
of  any  “value”  to  him  now?  Has  it  “sanction  from  the  proper  au- 
thority ? ” Go  back  through  all  the  4 ‘ proper  authority  ’ ’ and  the  maxi- 
mum purpose  stated  anywhere  is  ‘ 1 possibly  eighteen  feet.  ’ ’ How  is  this 
to  deal  with  Congress?  What  hope  can  we  have  here? 

I showed  before  that  the  report  of  Major  Mansfield  was  what  was 
sent  to  us  for  our  guidance.  He  says  on  page  1206,  once  quoted,  that 
this  report  of  Mr.  Ripley’s  is  “ a clear  and  comprehensive  exposition  of 
our  plans.”  Now  the  Chief  of  Engineers  adopts  it,  and  let  us  see  how 
he  proposes  to  give  us  4 4 at  least  twenty-five  feet”  of  water. 

Look  at  the  chart,  which  is  a part  of  the  report,  and  is  signed  by 
Major  Mansfield  in  official  form,  and  look  at  the  text  on  page  1211  and 
following: 

The  south  jetty  has  a total  length  of  15,330  feet,  and  extends  from  the  6-foot 
contour  at  its  inner  end  to  the  13?-foot  contour  at  its  outer  end.  Commencing 
at  the  inner  end,  the  top  for  4,080  feet  is  5 feet  below  the  water  surface. 

* * * * • * * ^ * 

The  north  jetty  has  a total  length  of  8,090  feet,  and  extends  from  the  outer 
end  of  the  Bolivar  gabionnade  to  the  12-foot  contour  across  the  bar. 

We  all  know  the  history  of  those  submerged  gabions.  Now,  sir,  here 
are  these  submerged  jetties  12,200  feet  apart — over  two  and  a quarter 
miles,  going  scarcely  to  twelve  feet  depth,  and  they,  according  to  this 
last  complexion,  are  to  give  us  4%t  least  twenty-five  feet”  of  water. 
Sir,  comment  is  unnecessary. 


11 


But  the  humble  assistant  and  the  officer  in  charge,  even  when  their 
reports  are  sent  to  us  professing  to  be  the  plan,  and  that  not  dissented 
from  by  the  Chief  of  Engineers  in  his  accompanying  report,  are  not 
“the  proper  authority.’ ’ Are  they  “proper  authority”  now?  Pray 
who  is  managing  this  business?  The  board  says  on  page  1229,  report 
of  1880,  in  speaking  of  these  jetties : 

Neither,  however,  should  be  carried  more  than  two  miles  seaward  until  the 
other  has  progressed  nearly  an  equal  ratio. 

On  page  1214,  same  report,  the  local  engineer  says: 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  therefore,  that  the  south  jetty  is  the  important  one, 
and  should  be  constructed  first. 

Now  which  has  been  done?  There  has  been  constructed  nearly  four 
and  one-half  miles  of  the  south  jetty  and  not  a foot  of  the  north  jetty, 
unless  it  be  a trial  section.  Was  this  according  to  the  plan  ? Was  it  by 
authority? 

The  map  of  1880,  says  General  Newton,  page  8 of  letter,  was  a 
“crude  idea.”  They  had  been  at  that  work  for  seven  years.  Was  it 
still  “crude?”  In  1881  and  in  1882  they  leave  out  the  north  jetty. 
In  1883  they  locate  it,  he  says,  in  a different  position.  Now,  in  1884 
we  seem  to  have  another  position,  suspended  out  in  the  sea.  Is  it  still 
crude?  I believe  it  is  more  crude  to-day  than  it  ever  was.  It  is  in  an 
inextricable  tangle,  and  neither  plan  nor  men  offer  the  slightest  basis 
for  hope. 

Colonel  Merrill  also  quotes  from  Major  Mansfield  and  says  the  south 
jetty  has  not  been  completed.  This  point  is  important  only  as  addi- 
tional evidence  of  the  kind  of  testimony  we  are  getting  and  of  the  faith 
we  can  have  in  the  way  matters  are  going  on.  I will  dispose  of  it  briefly. 
(See  report  of  1883,  page  1063.)  Here  is  a letter  from  Major  Mansfield 
to  the  mayor-elect  of  Galveston  in  regard  to  what  it  would  take  to  com- 
plete this  jetty.  Congress  had  failed  to  pass  a river  and  harbor  bill  the 
previous  session.  Galveston  was  willing  to  borrow  money  and  give  it 
to  the  work,  though  of  course  it  concerns  the  whole  State  of  Texas. 
Major  Mansfield  says: 

One  hundred  thousand  dollars  will  keep  the  work  on  through  the  summer, 
and  will  effect  the  entire  completion  of  the  south  jetty. 

He  got  the  money  and  spent  it  without  trouble  or  delay  to  the  “en- 
tire completion”  of  this  jetty,  and  yet  we  have  this  unqualified  state- 
ment made  to  us.  All  of  the  j etty  had  been  raised  to  “ its  full  height,  ’ 1 
except  a 6,000-foot  gap.  They  had  concluded  to  bring  the  jetty  higher 
than  any  plan  had  contemplated,  and  “the  $100,000  is  necessary  to 
close  this  gap.  ’ ’ Then  the  jetty  will  be  ‘ ‘ built  up  throughout  to  level 
of  mean  low  water,  ’ ’ which,  as  stated,  was  ‘ ‘ entire  completion.  ’ ’ That 
is  enough  of  this. 

Here  also  Major  Mansfield  states  that  he  expected  this  to  obtain  an 
18-foot  channel  by  the  following  fall,  but  the  only  effect  of  any  note 
was  the  deepening  of  a trench  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  jetty. 

This  brings  me  to  the  claim  now  made  of  the  effect  of  this  work  upon 
the  channel. 

The  Chief  of  Engineers  says  in  his  last  report  that  there  is  “ a very 
apparent  improvement  in  depth  over  the  outer  bar.” 

Major  Mansfield  says,  as  quoted  here  by  Colonel  Merrill: 

The  depth  of  water  over  the  outer  bar  has  been  improved  so  that  naviga  tion  has 
been  benefited  to  the  extent  of  about  two  feet,  and  this  has  been  accomplished 
by  the  Government  works,  which  consist  of  an  incomplete  jetty  running  from 
Fort  Point  out  to  the  crest  of  the  bar,  a distance  of  four  and  one-quarter  miles. 


12 


Now,  the  only  way  to  tell  what  the  effect  of  that  jetty  has  been  is  to 
take  the  depth  on  the  bar  at  the  time  it  was  begun  and  compare  it  with 
the  depth  on  the  bar  after  it  is  finished.  On  page  147  of  the  report  for 
1880,  the  Chief  of  Engineers  says: 

The  appropriation  of  $500,000  asked  for  is  to  be  applied  to  building  jetties  of 
brush  and  stone  directed  toward  obtaining  an  improved  depth  of  water  over 
the  outer  bar,  where  there  is  now  but  twelve  and  three-quarter  feet. 

Now  turn  to  page  1301  of  the  last  report,  and  we  see  that  the  pres- 
ent depth  is  stated  at  “thirteen  feet,”  and  as  for  any  movements  that 
have  taken  place  the  past  year,  they  are  summed  up  on  page  1298  in 
the  expression: 

No  benefit  to  navigation  has  resulted  yet. 

And  on  the  same  page  Major  Mansfield  himself  says: 

The  depth  of  thirteen  feet  at  mean  low  tide  in  the  jetty  channel  of  one  year 
ago  has  been  maintained. 

Mr.  REAGAN.  What  is  the  date? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  August  28  of  last  year.  It  is  the  last  re- 
port we  have  before  Congress.  Now,  what  was  the  original  depth  ? The 
original  depth  was  twelve  and  three- fourths  feet,  and  they  have  got,  as 
they  certify  in  print  here,  thirteen  feet,  which  is  an  increase  of  just 
three  inches.  As  shown  by  their  own  printed  statements  it  is  only  three 
inches,  yaet  these  gentlemen  report  to  Congress,  and  one  of  them  sol- 
emnly says,  ‘ ‘ there  is  a very  apparent  improvement  in  depth  over  the 
outer  bar,  ’ ’ and  the  other  one  says  it  is  two  feet. 

Mr.  SPRINGER.  What  is  the  difference  between  depth  at  low  tide 
there  and  high  tide? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  All  measurements  are  calculated  at  mean 
low  tide  unless  expressly  stated  to  the  contrary.  The  rise  of  the  tide 
there  is  a trifle  over  a foot. 

A Member.  Perhaps  they  made  a mistake. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  I think  they  did.  The  whole  thing  is  a 
mistake.  If  they  have  made  a single  ordinary  mistake  they  do  not  ex- 
plain it.  I will  say  that  we  have  time  and  again  tried  to  get  the  Chief 
of  Engineers  before  the  committee  to  inform  us  on  the  subject,  but  we 
have  never  been  able  to  get  him  there.  When  we  urged  him  to  come 

Mr.  WILLIS.  I hardly  think  my  friend  ought  to  go  that  far.  Gen- 
eral Newton  was  invited  before  the  committee  but  replied  he  was  on  a 
court-martial. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  I am  going  to  state  that.  Last  year  we  in- 
vited the  Chief  of  Engineers  before  our  committee  to  give  us  informa- 
tion, and  we  were  put  off  by  some  question  of  etiquette.  I want  to  state 
here,  as  I understand  it,  and  the  chairman  can  correct  me  if  lam  wrong, 
that  while  we  had  discussed  this  question  with  Captain  Eads,  the  en- 
gineer who  represented  one  view,  we  invited  the  Chief  of  Engineers 
again,  and  he  declined  to  come,  upon  the  statement  that  he  was  on  a 
court-martial  that  was  sitting  in  the  city.  Here  is  a great  national 
work  practically  in  his  charge,  and  a committee  of  the  Federal  Congress 
is  considering  the  matter  in  a short  session;  we  invite  him  to  meet  us, 
and  we  are  put  off  in  this  manner. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  He  was  obliged  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  sit  on  the  court-martial,  of  which  the  hours  are  fixed. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  If  it  is  not  a matter  of  discretion  with  him 
then  it  is  all  right.  None  of  us  seem  to  have  thought  of  that.  There 
was  no  court-martial  before.  It  is  doubtless  as  much  our  fault  as  his 


13 


that  the  Secretary  of  War  was  not  asked  to  let  the  court-martial  wait 
a few  hours  on  the  wants  of  Congress.  We  have  tried  this  two  ways 
and  during  two  sessions,  and  we  must  content  ourselves  with  the  printed 
testimony,  which  I have  mainly  gone  over.  I wish  to  condemn  most 
strongly  this  whole  way  of  dealing  with  the  public  interests. 

Major  Mansfield  is  quoted  by  Colonel  Merrill  as  saying: 

This  structure  is  a most  substantial  one,  and  is  not  likely  to  deteriorate  much. 

I presume  this  means  that  the  jetty  is  in  a good  state  of  preservation. 
I dislike  very  much  to  have  to  contradict  that  statement.  It  is  very 
painful  to  me,  as  this  whole  business  is,  but  I have  no  right  to  regard 
my  personal  reluctance.  I hold  in  my  hand  the  soundings  I made  on 
that  jetty  last  autumn,  being  in  company  with  Major  Mansfield  him- 
self, and  I estimate  that  not  less  than  50  per  cent. , as  shown  by  the 
soundings  on  the  crest  of  the  jetty  after  you  get  a little  out  from  the 
shore  end,  is  gone.  I have  the  soundings  here  in  my  note  -book.  Major 
Mansfield  accompanied  me  in  an  open  boat;  I did  a part  of  the  sound- 
ings, and  I had  one  of  his  employes  do  the  other  part  of  it,  I taking 
down  the  notes  as  we  went  and  making  a summary  statement  of  the 
first  part.  Major  Mansfield  may  be  erroneously  quoted;  but  here  are 
the  facts,  and  they  are  my  guide. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  Will  the  gentleman  permit  a further  question  ? 

Mr.  BLANCHARD.  Let  me  ask  the  gentleman  first  when  was  that  ? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  It  was  last  fall ; in  November  of  last  year. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  I desire  to  ask  the  gentleinan  (as  it  is  necessary 
to  know  in  connection  with  such  measurements)  from  what  surface  he 
started  ? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  I took  it  from  the  usual  surface  of  meas- 
urement adopted  by  the  engineers.  The  point  is  that  this  j etty  is  stated 
in  this  report  to  have  been  brought  up  by  them  to  mean  low  tide.  That 
you  find  established  on  page  1063,  report  of  1882,  and  the  oral  state- 
ments also  were  made  to  me.  Now,  I took  my  soundings  at  an  un- 
usually low  state  of  the  tide,  and  consequently  the  statement  I attack 
has  all  the  benefits  of  the  elements  on  its  side.  I find  in  my  notes  this 
remark:  “ The  pilot  says  the  water  was  lower  than  he  had  seen  it  in  a 
long  time.” 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  Will  my  friend  permit  another  question  ? Did 
you  have  any  means  of  knowing  how  that  measurement  or  point  from 
which  you  measured  compared  with  the  bench-mark  usually  taken  as 
the  low-tide  mark  ? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE  The  engineer  who  accompanied  me,  and  also 
the  marine  men  acquainted  with  the  facts,  informed  me  that  at  that 
time  it  was  unusually  low  tide.  The  work  had  previously  been  a little 
out  of  higher  water  than  that,  and  I am  giving  its  present  depth  below 
a lower  surface  of  water. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  But  the  gentleman  knows  that  there  is  a bench- 
mark from  which  such  comparisons  are  made. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  Of  course  I do  not  question  that.  We  all 
know  that. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  This  bench-mark  is  the  datum  plane  or  line.  I 
have  had  much  experience  in  water  measurement,  and  there  may  be  in 
such  cases  a mistake  in  beginning  the  measurement  from  the  wrong 
point,  instead  of  taking  a surface  point  or  datum-plane  which  has  been 
established. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  Nothing  can  effect  the  practical  fact  that  at 


14 


what  I was  informed  was  an  unusual  low  condition  of  the  tide  I made 
this  sounding  on  that  jetty,  which,  as  we  know,  had  been  brought 
visibly  up  to  the  surface  of  the  water  and  a little  above  it,  and  now,  at 
unusually  low  tide,  I found  points— there  were  plenty  of  places,  even 
then — where  a steamboat  could  run  over  the  jetty,  and  I have  the  meas- 
urements here  to  show  the  facts. ' 

Here  they  are,  running  ten,  nine,  and  seven  feet  under  water  on  the 
crest,  though  the  average  of  course  is  less.  When  there  happened  to 
be  a spit  of  sand  we  would  find  it  as  shoal  as  three  feet,  or  even  eighteen 
inches;  but  the  outer  half  of  the  jetty  shows  an  average  depth  on  the 
crest  of,  say,  six  and  one-half  feet,  with  an  occasional  high  point.  Near 
shore  it  is  well  preserved,  owing  to  sand  there,  and  to  being  much  higher 
originally,  as  shown  in  the  last  report,  than  the  other  parts. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  carry  this  analysis  further.  I do  not 
believe  that  there  is  a single  essential  statement  in  General  Newton’s 
letter,  or  in  the  joint  paper  from  Colonel  Merrill  and  Major  Mansfield, 
that  is  not  as  erroneous  as  these  propositions  of  which  I have  just  treated. 
This  work  is  but  a sample  of  much  that  is  going  on  all  around  the  coast. 
We  have  made  appropriations  for  other  harbors  under  a species  of  pro- 
test, for  we  provide  a temporary  harbor  board,  to  be  composed  mainly 
of  men  not  associated  with  these  wretched  schemes,  most  of  which  as- 
suredly should  never  have  been  begun,  and  that  board  is  to  report  fully 
to  the  next  Congress. 

I am  a plain,  business  man,  and  I try  to  look  at  things  in  a plain, 
common-sense  way,  and  I think  that  surely  there  can  be  no  bureau  of 
the  Government  more  sadly  in  need  of  reform  than  this  one  is.  The 
officers  are  free  from  corruption ; but  there  is  a thorough  unfitness  for 
this  work.  There  is  an  easy-going,  indifferent,  unreliable  way  of  doing 
things  that  needs  to  be  stirred  up  and  reorganized  from  the  very  bot- 
tom. The  time  has  come  for  a change.  The  people  won’t  stand  this. 
They  ought  not  to  stand  it.  And  we  need  to  start  a reform  here  in 
Congress.  We  should  select  proven  ability  for  these  works,  settle  upon 
works  with  greater  care,  and  then  make  adequate  appropriations  for 
them.  Unless  we  are  going  to  complete  a work  in  the  right  way  it  is 
a public  duty  that  we  should  not  undertake  it  at  all. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  And  let  me  say  here  that  this  should  not 
be  a political  bill  or  a log-rolling  measure,  or  a bill  to  distribute  the 
public  revenues,  or  anything  of  that  kind.  With  due  regard  to  the 
equities  it  should  be  a business  measure  for  the  improvement  of  the 
commerce  of  our  country,  with  neither  Democracy  nor  Republicanism 
in  it. 

Now  we  propose  to  employ  an  engineer  second  to  none  in  the  world, 
to  supply  the  Secretary  of  War  with  money,  and  to  tell  him  to  improve 
this  harbor  according  to  the  plans  of  a man  in  whom  we  have  confidence. 
We  are  not  here  to  do  anything  for  him,  but  we  want  to  hire  him  to 
do  something  for  us.  He  can  make  nothing  but  his  $5,000  a year  and 
his  $3,000  a foot.  He  has  not  the  spending  of  a dollar.  He  tells  us  the 
work  must  be  almost  entirely  of  stone  or  concrete,  and  he  tells  us  the 
approximate  cost.  We  find  it  far  less  than  the  estimates  of  our  engi- 
neers of  cost  for  an  equal  extent  of  inferior  work  upon  the  basis  of  their 
South  Pass  estimates,  allowing  the  usual  percentage  for  contingencies. 
This  eminent  engineer  tells  us  that  there  is  not  a particle  of  doubt  about 
making  the  work  a success.  But  he  will  do  it  as  all  the  great  jetty 
works  in  the  world  are  done. 


15 


How  idle  are  estimates  for  the  present  plan  ! The  work  is  located 
wrong  to  start  with.  Had  this  sort  of  work  been  located  right  we  have 
no  assurance  that  we  have  confidence  in  that  any  amount  of  money 
thus  applied  would  ever  get  and  maintain  a good  channel.  The  sea  has 
destroyed  all  of  the  north  jetty.  The  tide  and  teredo  have  destroyed 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  one-half  of  the  south  jetty.  The  bar  would  move 
seaward  if  the  feeble  things  were  finished,  and  leave  you  worse  off  than 
before.  What  is  your  condition  now,  after  vast  expenditures?  What 
would  it  be  in  this  line  if  you  wasted  millions  in  this  way?  Colonel 
Merrill  says:  “It  is  quite  possible,’  ’ in  speaking  of  such  work,  “that 
one  or  the  other  [jetty]  might  require  removal.” 

The  doctrine  laid  down  by  Eads  is  to  be  sure  you  have  mastered  your 
subject  before  you  begin  work,  and  then  push  it  with  all  possible  speed. 
General  Newton  says  Hartley’s  works  at  the  Sulina  mouth  of  the  Dan- 
ube “were  eminently  tentative  in  their  character.  ” I find  the  reverse 
to  be  the  case.  The  first  work  was  provisional,  but  the  tracings  were 
exactly  the  same,  and  when  Hartley  began  his  work  he  pushed  out 
upon  his  lines  with  th$  utmost  dispatch.  The  Dutch  works  of  the 
Scheur  branch  of  the  River  Maas,  says  General  Newton,  “is  a case 
where  heroic  treatment  has  been  applied,  with  the  result  of  an  imme- 
diate failure.  ” The  reverse  is  true.  The  treatment  was  feeble.  The 
jetties  were  much  wider  apart  than  was  the  cut  that  supplied  water  for 
them;  consequently  a vast  amount  of  dredging  had  to  be  done;  and 
instead  of  the  bar  being  dispersed  by  a vigorous  current,  it  was  simply 
turned  over  by  slow  degrees  to  be  as  bad  an  obstruction  as  it  was  be- 
fore. They  have  since  imparted  energy  to  the  current  by  adequate 
contraction. 

Now  shall  we  stop  this  trifling  and  give  these  people  a harbor  ? Here 
are  nine  hundred  miles  of  coast  and  not  a harbor.  Here  is  the  first 
cotton-growing  State  in  the  Union,  here  is  the  first  wool-producing 
State  in  the  Union,  here  is  the  first  cattle-raising  State  in  the  Union, 
here  are  over  2,000,000  of  people,  $120,000,000  annually  of  farm  prod- 
ucts, $1,000,000,000  of  the  people’s  wealth,  6,000  miles  of  railroads 
carrying  their  commerce,  not  to  speak  of  adjacent  States,  and  all  are 
suffering  from  the  lack  of  a harbor.  The  entire  territory  dependent  is 
equal  to  all  of  the  New  England  States  and  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Delaware,  Virginia,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois, 
Michigan,  Wisconsin,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Iowa, 
Minnesota,  and  Nebraska.  Shall  we  give  this  region  a harbor?  I say 
yes,  and  I call  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  striking  fact  that  from 
Hampton  Roads,  almost  at  the  base  of  the  Capitol,  to  the  Mexican  line, 
nearly  3,000  miles,  there  is  only  one  harbor  entrance  where  a first-class 
merchantman  or  a well-appointed  man-of-war  can  float.  That  is  the 
south  pass  of  the  Mississippi  River.  Pensacola  is  questionable  and  un- 
certain. 

Mr.  DIBBLE.  Will  the  gentleman  from  Arkansas  permit  me  to  in- 
terrupt him  long  enough  to  say  that  Port  Royal,  on  the  South  Carolina 
coast,  has  twenty-six  feet  of  water? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  The  commerce  of  that  point  is  so  small  that 
I did  not  remember  it.  I accept  the  statement  of  the  gentleman. 
There  seems  to  be  that  remote  point  which  has  twenty-six  feet  of 
water.  But  take  a city  like  Wilmington  or  Savannah  or  Charleston  or 
Mobile.  They  are  all  second  or  even  third-class  harbors;  and  our  com- 
merce must  not  be  compelled  to  make  the  long  and  expensive  hauls  to 
New  Orleans  and  Hampton  Roads. 


Mr.  KING.  Twenty-six  feet  of  water  does  not  admit  a first-class 
man-of-war  or  modern  merchantman. 

Mr.  DIBBLE.  The  Great  Eastern  only  draws  twenty- eight  feet. 

Mr.  KING.  In  New  Orleans  a ship  drawing  twenty-nine  or  thirty 
feet  can  enter. 

Mr.  Nicholls  rose. 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  Do  not  talk  across  me.  I have  no  time  to 
yield  for  further  interruption. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  one  other  point  I desire  to  discuss — 
and  these  remarks  are  much  less  complete  and  much  less  compact  than 
I would  like  to  make  them. 

I want  to  call  attention  to  our  action  about  the  Mississippi  River 
Commission.  The  bill  shows  that  we  provide  for  an  advisory  engineer 
for  the  commission,  and  we  recommend  that  James  B.  Eads  be  ap- 
pointed to  the  place,  and  we  require  the  Secretary  of  War  to  carry  on 
the  improvement  of  that  river  according  to  the  plans,  &c.,  of  the  com- 
mission as  the  same  may  be  approved  or  amended  by  the  advisory  en- 
gineer. 

This,  too,  has  been  rightly  called  a radical  step.  Nothing  of  an  ordi- 
nary character  could  justify  us  for  a moment  in  taking  such  a step  as 
this,  and  it  is  proper  and  unavoidable  that  the  House  and  the  country 
be  given  the  reasons  for  our  course.  I will  say  that  it  is  the  result  of  the 
most  mature  consideration  and  counsel ; and  at  a very  full  sitting  of  the 
committee,  after  long  and  protracted  discussion,  all  present  agreed  to 
this  step  except  my  friend  from  Pennsylvania  [Mr.  Bayne].  I do  not 
consider  it  necessary  to  reply  to  the  dissenting  argument  my  friend  has 
made.  It  needs  no  reply.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  my  friend  from  West 
Virginia  [Mr.  Gibson],  who  also  dissents,  was  not  present  at  that  meet- 
ing. His  speech  needs  no  reply.  I can  not  but  hope  that  had  he  been 
present  and  participated  in  our  lengthy  and  earnest  proceedings  he  would 
have  concurred  in  our  general  purpose.  But  of  course  this  is  conjec- 
tural. 

I will  try  to  explain  the  reasons  for  our  decision. 

This  commission  was  organized  under  an  act  approved  June  28, 1879. 
It  was  composed  of  seven  members:  Col.  Q.  A.  Gilmore,  president  of 
the  commission;  Maj.  Charles  R.  Suter,  Maj.  C.  B.  Comstock,  all  of  the 
Engineer  Corps  of  the  Army;  James  B.  Eads,  and  B.  M.  Harrod,  civil 
engineers,  and  Hon.  Benjamin  Harrison,  now  a Senator  from  Indiana. 
The  personnel  has  somewhat  changed — Mr.  Eads  has  gone  out,  Mr.  Har- 
rison has  gone  out;  but  I need  not  dwell  upon  that.  In  plain  terms, 
they  were  to  take  charge  of  the  whole  question  of  the  improvement  of 
the  Mississippi  River  from  Cairo  to  the  Galf.  Their  jurisdiction  is  now 
somewhat  enlarged.  The  idea  of  a board  or  commission  for  this  vast 
and  vital  business  was  and  still  is  a wise  one. 

After  long  and  mature  consideration  the  commission  agreed  upon  a 
plan  for  the  improvement  of  the  river.  That  plan  is  set  forth  in  their 
first  report  (Senate  Executive  Document  No.  58,  second  session,  Forty- 
sixth  Congress,  and  dated  March  6, 1880).  The  report  treats  with  great 
clearness  of  the  philosophy  of  the  case,  and  it  lays  down  a plan  of  work 
in  conformity  thereto,  reciting  successful  practice.  It  is  not  necessary 
for  me  to  recite  the  accompanying  dissenting  reportof  Major  Comstock 
and  Mr.  Harrison,  for  they  concur  in  the  general  features  and  only  dis- 
sent in  “some  less  important  points.”  This  plan  has  received  the  ap- 
proval of  Congress  and  the  country.  This  is  evinced  by  several  appro- 
priations by  Congress,  aggregating  over  $8,000,000,  which,  with  the 


17 


appropriation  in  this  bill,  will  amount  to  over  $11,000,000.  I do  not 
include  anything  above  Cairo.  The  people  have  applauded  this;  execu- 
tives have  recommended  it,  and  both  political  parties  in  national  con- 
vention have  pledged  themselves  to  the  continuation  of  the  work. 

Now,  sir,  wheat  is  the  plan  to  which  we  have  pinned  our  faith,  and 
of  which  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt?  I can  best  state  it  by  reading 
extracts  from  the  first  report  of  the  commission.  On  page  16  it  says: 

It  has  been  observed  in  the  Mississippi  River,  and  is  indeed  true  of  all  silt- 
bearing  streams  flowing  through  alluvial  deposits,  that  the  more  nearly  the 
high  river  width,  or  width  between  the  banks,  approaches  to  uniformity,  the 
more  nearly  uniform  will  be  the  channel  depth,  the  less  will  be  the  variationsof 
velocity,  and  the  less  the  rate  of  caving  to  be  expected  in  concave  bends.  * * * 
Uniformity  of  width  secured  by  contraction  will  produce  increased  velocity,  and 
therefore  increased  erosion  of  bed  at  the  shoal  places,  accompanied  by  a corre- 
sponding deposit  of  silt  and  deep  places,  and  consequently  greater  uniformity 
of  depth. 

Uniform  depth  joined  to  uniform  width — that  is  to  say,  uniformity  of  effective 
cross-section — implies  uniform  velocity,  and  this  means  that  there  will  be  no 
violent  eddies  or  cross-currents,  and  no  great  and  sudden  fluctuations  in  the 
silt-transporting  power  of  the  current.  There  will,  therefore,  be  less  erosion 
from  oblique  currents  and  eddies,  and  no  formation  of  shoals  and  bars  pro- 
duced by  silt  taken  up  from  one  part  of  the  channel  and  dropped  in  another. 

f * * ¥ * ¥ ¥ 

The  work  to  be  done,  therefore,  is  to  scour  out  and  maintain  a channel  through 
the  shoals  and  bars  * * * and  to  build  up  new  banks  and  develop  new 
shore  lines,  so  as  to  establish,  so  far  as  practicable,  the  requisite  conditions  of 
uniform  velocity  for  all  stages  of  the  river. 

******  * 

This  improvement  can  be  accomplished  below  Cairo  by  contracting  the  low- 
water  channel  way  to  an  approximately  uniform  width  of  about  3,000  feet, 
* * * by  causing,  through  the  action  of  appropriate  works  constructed  at  suit- 
able localities,  the  deposition  of  sand  and  other  earthy  materials  transported 
by  the  water  upon  the  dry  bars  and  other  portions  of  the  present  bed  not  em- 
braced within  the  limits  of  the  proposed  low-water  channel.  The  ultimate 
effect  sought  to  be  produced  by  such  deposits  is  a comparative  uniformity  in 
the  width  of  the  high-water  channel  of  the  river. 

• * * * * * * 

These  constructions  will  commonly  be  open  or  permeable  to  such  a degree 
that  * * * they  will  sufficiently  check  the  current  to  induce  a deposit  of  silt 
in  selected  localities. 

I could  cite  more,  but  this  is  enough.  I will  add,  however,  that  an- 
other important  feature  was  the  closure  of  outlets  of  which  the  Atclia- 
falaya  was  perhaps  the  most  important.  It  was  agreed  to  at  once  stop 
the  enlargement  of  that  outlet,  but  not  to  take  further  action  until  the 
report  of  Major  Benyaurd,  who  was  then  making  a survey  of  it,  should 
be  received.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  first  step  was  $10,000. 

I will  now  turn  to  the  second  report  of  the  commission  (there  was 
another  report  the  meanwhile,  which,  however,  relates  principally  to 
other  matters),  which  is  dated  November  25,  1881,  and  begins  on  page 
2745  of  the  report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  of  that  year.  In  this  report 
the  commission  shows  that  it  has  not  silled  the  Atchafalaya,  and  it 
continues  to  promise  that  the  initial  step  shall  be  taken.  Running 
through  the  whole  report  there  is  a confusion  of  thought,  and  therefore 
I turn  to  the  report  of  Mr.  Eads,  which  accompanies  the  report  of  the 
commission,  for  a plain  and  clear  restatement  of  the  original  plan  of 
improvement.  Mr.  Eads,  I believe,  was  also  the  author  of  the  first  re- 
port. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  Did  I understand  the  gentleman  to  say  that  the 
author  of  the  first  report  was  Captain  Eads  ? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  It  is  so  stated. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  I wish  to  say  that  I have  known  that  all  along 
since  I have  known  anything  about  engineering,  and  it  is  good  sense. 

Be 2 


18 


Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  I will  not  go  over  Mr.  Eads’s  reasoning 
about  the  Atchafalaya,  in  the  course  of  which  he  urges  most  strenu- 
ously that  immediate  action  be  taken  toward  the  closure  of  that  peril- 
ous outlet,  and  says  that  the  closure  should  be  completed  in  “six 
years,  ” so  as  to  restrain  ‘ ‘ about  one-sixth  of  its  volume  per  annum.  ’ ’ 
This  general  subject  is  also  treated  with  the  greatest  clearness  and  abil- 
ity in  the  report  signed  by  the  gentleman  from  Illinois  [Mr.  Thomas] 
and  the  gentleman  from  Louisiana  [Mr.  Ellis] — in  their  report  accom- 
panying the  Burrows  report.  These  two  papers  are  masterly  and  com- 
plete, and  no  thoughtful  man  can  read  them  without  concluding  that 
advocates  of  the  “outlet  ” theory  are  among  the  most  mistaken  of  men. 
There  is  no  proposition  more  opposed  to  numberless  facts,  more  incon- 
sistent with  reason,  or  more  universally  condemned  by  all  classes  of 
engineers.  But  Mr.  Eads,  in  summing  up  the  adopted  plan  on  page 
2775,  says: 

The  plan  of  improvement  recommended  by  the  commission  differs  from  any 
other  previously  proposed  for  the  correction  of  the  channel  in  the  fact  that  it 
looks  to  a rectification  of  the  high-water  channel  by  the  ultimate  narrowing  of 
these  wide  places  as  the  only  method  by  which  a deep  and  uniform  low-water 
channel  can  be  permanently  secured. 

The  wide  places  in  the  high-water  channel  create  alternations  of  current  ve- 
locity and  steeper  slopes  to  overcome  the  excessive  frictional  resistance.  These 
cause  the  water  to  be  highly  charged  with  sediment  at  one  part  of  its  journey  to 
the  sea,  and  much  less  highly  charged  at  others.  This  creates  scouring  and  de- 
positing in  the  bed,  and  radical  changes  in  the  channel  by  the  caving  away  of 
its  banks. 

By  reducing  these  wide  places  to  a width  approximately  the  same  as  that  of 
the  narrow  parts  of  the  river  the  friction  is  reduced,  a lower  slope  and. uniform 
depth  will  be  obtained,  and  the  velocity  of  current  will  not  be  subject  to  its 
present  changes.  A uniform  charge  of  current  will  result  from  uniform  current 
velocity,  and  the  caving  of  the  banks  will  then  be  practically  arrested  for  the 
reason  that  when  the  water  has  the  full  charge  of  sediment  due  to  its  velocity  it 
can  carry  no  more,  and  can  not,  therefore,  scour  the  channel  more  deeply,  by 
which  the  undermining  of  the  banks  is  effected. 

Permanence  of  channel  will  not,  therefore,  be  secured  until  these  excessive 
widths  are  reduced.  A less  depth  at  low  water  than  twenty  feet  will  not  insure 
stability  of  channel,  for  the  reason  that  a less  depth  will  result  from  only  a par- 
tial reduction  of  the  wide  places.  Permanence  of  channel  will  be  attained  only 
in  proportion  as  uniformity  of  width  of  the  high-water  channel  is  attained,  and 
when  this  is  secured  the  depth  at  low  water  may  be  considerably  more  than 
twenty  feet,  but  it  will  certainly  not  be  less.  The  sooner  these  wide  places  are 
corrected  the  less  will  the  improvement  of  the  river  cost. 

* * & * * # * 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  entire  feasibility  of  so  correcting  the  Mississippi 
River  from  Cairo  to  the  Gulf  that  a channel  depth  of  twenty  feet  during  the 
low-water  seasons  can  be  permanently  secured  throughout  its  entire  course. 

Upon  the  basis  of  this  plan  the  commission  estimated,  on  page  2752 
of  report  of  1881,  that  the  entire  cost  of  improving  the  six  reaches  from 
Cairo  to  Red  River,  one  hundred  and  eighty- four  miles,  would  be 
$8,226,000,  and  for  the  entire  river  to  that  point  $33,000,000.  There 
was  no  material  dissent  from  this. 

After  this  the  breach  between  Captain  Eads  and  the  majority  of  the 
commission  further  widened.  Captain  Eads  contended  for  a "faithful 
adherence  to  the  plan  and  doctrine  laid  down,  while  the  majority  of 
the  commission  seemed  unable  to  realize  the  fixed  laws  of  nature;  they 
never  seemed  to  clearly  grasp  the  problem  in  hand,  and  they  varied  and 
dallied  as  men  often  do  in  controversy  and  when  they  immediately 
confront  a question  too  great  for  them  the  principles  of  which  in  calm 
moments  they  clearly  admit. 

The  very  simplicity  of  the  great  question  seems  to  baffle  them.  They 
failed  to  grasp  the  central  facts  and  ideas.  The  result  of  this  was  that 
Captain  Eads  afterward  resigned  from  the  commission,  it  being  an  open 


19 


secret  that  he  did  so  in  order  to  escape  the  responsibility  of  errors  which 
he  had  clearly  pointed  out  but  could  not  avert.  He  did  not  participate 
in  the  proceedings  of  the  commission  after  the  report  I have  quoted  from. 
The  country  did  not  appreciate  the  force  of  the  weak  tendency  that  had 
set  in,  and  1 know  that  it  was  only  near  the  close  of  the  last  session  of 
Congress  that,  for  my  own  part,  I became  fully  aware  and  seriously 
alarmed  at  the  course  the  commission  was  taking. 

It  then  began  to  appear  plain  to  me  that  the  commission  was  radi- 
cally and  fatally  departing  from  the  plan  of  work  we  thought  they  were 
pursuing,  and  I have  since  studied  the  reports  with  greater  care  than 
before,  and  I have  renewed  my  examination  of  most  of  their  work. 
This  departure  has  been  a growth.  It  has  been  like  increasing  weak- 
ness, until  now  the  present  report  comes  to  us  and  it  contains  plans 
and  statements  that  must  be  squarely  met  by  all  who  have  real  con- 
victions or  any  high  purpose  in  connection  with  the  river. 

I will  trace  this  matter.  In  the  next  report  after  the  one  I last  read 
from,  that  is,  in  the  report  for  1882,  after  Eads  had  ceased  to  take  a part 
in  the  proceedings,  you  find  in  a paper  from  Professor  Mitchel,  a mem- 
ber of  the  commission,  a gentleman  looked  upon  as  simply  a technical 
adviser,  the  following  language  on  page  263: 

Indeed,  under  the  general  rule  that  the  bars  form  at  the  reversion  points  of 
curves  it  is  evident  that  their  position  must  vary  as  these  curves  vary,  and  that 
the  holding  of  the  curves  by  revetment  or  otherwise  is  an  essential  early  step 
in  the  control  of  the  river.  It  antedates  logically  the  retrenchment  which  is  to 
deepen  the  water  at  the  bars. 

This  is  a new  doctrine.  It  is  true  it  is  put  in  an  obscure  place,  and 
in  very  small  print;  but  it  comes,  as  by  request,  from  one  of  the  com- 
mission, and  it  seems  as  if  they  are  seeking  a new  conclusion. 

We  had  previously  been  told  that  to  narrow  these  wide  and  shoal  places  by 
silt-arresting  works  was  the  only  method  by  which  a deep  and  uniform  low- 
water  channel  can  be  permanently  secured. 

Of  course  this  was  to  be  in  connection  with  high-water  treatment. 

We  were  also  told  that — 

The  wide  places  in  the  high-water  channel  create  alternations  of  current  ve- 
locity, &c. 

And  then  that — 

This  creates  * * * radical  changes  in  the  channel  by  the  caving  away  of 
its  banks. 

We  were  told  that — 

Permanence  of  channel  will  not,  therefore,  be  secured  until  these  excessive 
widths  are  reduced. 

And  that  when  we  properly  reduce  these  excessive  widths  where  the 
bars  are  then — 

Uniform  depth  will  be  obtained  and  the  velocity  of  current  will  not  be  sub- 
ject to  its  present  changes. 

When  that  is  done — 

A uniform  charge  of  current  will  result. 

And  that — 

The  caving  of  the  banks  will  then  be  practically  arrested. 

This  stands  to  reason,  and  it  has  never  failed  in  all  its  numerous  prac- 
tice. The  professor  loses  sight  of  the  cross-over  bars  in  the  channel, 
where  you  find  from  five  to  fifteen  feet  of  water,  while  in  the  caving 
bends  the  water  is,  say,  one  hundred  feet  deep  and  often  deeper.  These 
submerged  bars  always  join  the  lower  and  the  upper  ends  of  the  dry 
bars,  and  they  are  not  “at  the  reversion  points  of  curves;”  but  they 


20 


form  just  where  the  river  passes  the  sustaining  wall  or  bank  that  has 
been  caving  and  spreads  out  and  unloads  at  this  wide  and  sluggish  point 
in  floods  preparatory  to  running  with  increased  and  destructive  velocity 
into  the  next  bend  below.  This  is  the  bar  that  causes  the  mischief. 
This  is  the  bar  that  was  to  be  “ scoured  out  ’ ’ by  contracting  the  dry 
bars  just  here  and  at  their  other  parts  as  additional  aid  as  the  “only  ” 
method  by  which  the  river  could  possibly  be  improved.  Now,  this 
contraction  upon  these  wide  bars  is  to  be  preceded  by  something  else. 

If  the  Mississippi  River  were  dry  and  you  started  in  a buggy  to  drive 
down  its  bed  from  Cairo  to  the  Gulf  you  would  have  a very  up  and  down 
hill  road  to  travel.  In  plaees  you  would  be  in  a deep  and  narrow  gorge, 
and  again  you  would  be  upon  a hill-top,  nearly  up  to  the  brink  of  the 
bank,  and  a broad  expanse  of  sand  would  stretch  out  perhaps  for  miles 
on  either  side  of  you.  You  would  then  be  up  on  a sand-bar,  while 
your  previous  position  was  where  there  had  been  a caving  bend.  Now, 
suppose  this  bed  be  filled  again  with  a great  flood.  You  readily  see 
that  when  the  water  gets  to  the  broad  and  shallow  bar  it  spreads  out 
and  loses  a part  of  its  velocity. 

The  velocity  is  also  diminished  by  the  friction  opposed  to  the  water 
by  this  vast  exposure  of  bottom  surface.  A part  of  the  sediment  that 
the  river  was  able  to  carry  before  it  was  thus  retarded  by  dispersion 
and  by  friction  is  of  course  at  once  dropped  to  the  bottom.  Thus  the 
bar  goes  on  building  down-stream,  adding  below  what  may  be  picked 
up  at  its  head.  But  the  water  has  a certain  distance  to  tall  before  it 
reaches  the  Gulf,  and  it  will  make  up  for  this  almost  no  surface  slope 
upon  the  bar  by  plunging  headlong  into  the  bend  below,  and  in  its 
new  course  it  will  pick  up  a new  load  of  sediment  from  the  bottom. 
This  destroys  the  repose  of  the  bank,  and  as  soon  as  the  sustaining 
pressure  of  the  water  is  taken  from  the  side  of  the  bank  by  the  falling 
of  the  water  the  bank  will  begin  to  cave  in.  They  are  land  slides. 

This  new  load  of  sediment  will  not  be  dropped  until  another  wide 
place  is  reached,  at  which  the  river  will  again  spread  out  and  the  same 
operation  will  be  repeated,  this  new  bar  causing  the  same  trouble  be- 
low it  that  the  previous  bar  has  caused  just  above.  Wide  places  and 
sand-bars  are  exchangeable  terms.  I repeat  that  the  cure  laid  down 
for  this  trouble  is  to  remove  the  cause.  That  is  to  say,  you  will  erect 
contraction- works  at  the  wide  places  so  as  to  bring  the  river  at  that 
point  to  its  normal  and  proper  width.  Then  the  river  may  want  to 
spread,  but  you  will  not  let  it.  If  you  do  not  let  it  disperse  then  it  can 
not  drop  its  load  of  sediment.  If  it  is  kept  loaded,  then  it  can  not  take 
up  any  more  load  when  it  gets  into  the  next  bend.  As  I said  before,  the 
slope  of  the  surface  of  the  water  is  nearly  level  on  a bar.  As  soon  as  it 
gets  over  the  bar  the  slope  of  the  water  is  steep  compared  to  what  it 
was  on  the  bar,  and  of  course  the  current  is  correspondingly  swift. 

But  you  will  soon  make  the  water  cut  out  the  bar,  and  you  then  not 
only  send  the  current  loaded  into  the  bend,  but  you  also,  by  the  re- 
moval of  the  bar,  have  deprived  the  current  of  the  cause  of  its  excessive 
velocity.  You  have  then  brought  about  a general  state  of  uniformity. 
Then  it  is  that  “the  caving  of  the  banks  will  be  practically  arrested.” 
What  revetting  you  then  must  do  will  be  only  an  incident,  and  easy  to 
do.  A good  deal  of  this  sort  would  be  needed;  £ut  it  will  be  easy  to 
do,  and  comparatively  inexpensive. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  works  are  imperiled,  I reply  that  you  are  put- 
ting them  where  the  river  is  constructive  and  not  destructive.  You 
treat  the  river  at  its  lazy  parts  and  help  it  to  follow  its  natural  bent. 


21 


This  then  was  to  be  done  by  proper  contraction  at  the  excessively 
wide  places.  The  constructions  for  this  purpose  were  to  be  ‘ 4 commonly 
open  or  permeable’ ’ so  that  they  will  sufficiently  check  the  current  to 
induce  a deposit  of  silt  in  selected  localities.  They  were  to  effect  “ the 
deposition  of  sand  and  other  earthy  materials  transported  by  the  water 
upon  the  dry  bars  and  other  portions  of  the  present  bed  not  embraced 
within  the  limits  of  the  proposed  low- water  channel.” 

This  is  what  was  to  be  done,  so  that  the  water  would  be  made  to  re- 
move the  bars,  the  cause  of  the  caving,  for  surely  we  can  do  nothing 
unless  we  can  hold  the  banks.  The  qnestion  is  how  are  they  to  be  held 
and  how  can  they  be  held?  These  works  would  promptly  “ scour  out 
and  maintain  a channel  through  the  shoals  and  bars.  ’ ’ 

Now,  however,  they  are  not  going  to  effect  a cure  by  removing  the 
cause,  but  by  treating  the  effect.  Indeed  they  have  changed  their 
views  as  to  what  is  the  cause.  We  shall  see  later  on  how  futile  it  is  to 
go  into  the  teeth  of  the  river  in  this  way,  and  then  we  can  better  judge 
whether  or  not  we  ought  to  permit  the  commission  to  commit  us  to 
this  change  of  plan. 

What  I have  read  from  Professor  Mitchell’s  paper  prepares  us  to  ex- 
pect the  expression  in  the  main  report,  page  11,  “the  main  item  of 
cost  will  of  course  be  the  bank  protection.  ’ ’ This  was  the  only  prom- 
inent intimation  then  of  these  growing  errors.  It  is  very  forcible  in 
the  light  of  later  events. 

And  so  matters  go  until  near  the  close  of  last  session  we  had  the  com- 
mission before  the  River  and  Harbor  Committee.  It  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  their  influence  with  the  committee  was  much  greater  before  we 
heard  them  than  it  was  afterward.  Soon  after  that  we  were  startled 
with  the  information  that  the  extensive  revetment  work  at  Memphis  and 
in  Hopefield  Bend  was  a total  loss,  and  that  great  city  was  in  imminent 
peril,  with  the  vital  interests  of  the  vast  commerce  that  seeks  its  facil- 
ities in  equal  danger.  We  found  that  the  entire  work  there  had  been 
upon  this  new  plan.  Last  session  Congress  gave  $200,000  for  the  emer- 
gency, and  we  find  that  it  too  is  being  spent  in  the  same  way.  Not  a 
dollar  has  been  or  is  being  spent  to  remove  the  cause  of  all  this  trouble: 
that  is,  the  bars  above.  They  revet  where  the  water  is  one  hundred 
and  one  hundred  and  five  feet  deep,  while  just  above  lie  the  fatal  bars, 
with  some  eight  and  twelve  feet  of  depth. 

The  current  continues  to  come  upon  them  with  unabated  fury,  stripped 
of  its  load  and  ready  for  the  fray,  and  poor  obstinate  man  stands  there 
fighting  the  laws  of  God. 

Why  not  conform  to  nature  and  seek  her  potent  aid  ? Is  it  because 
their  great  rival  told  them  what  to  do  and  they  are  unwilling  to  learn  ? 
Are  the  public  interests  to  suffer  for  this  ? Eads  told  them  the  truth. 
He  understood  the  case.  It  is  not  Eads  we  are  fighting  for  or  the  com- 
mission we  are  fighting  against.  It  is  the  engineering  truth  we  want, 
and  he  happened  to  understand  it  and  these  gentlemen  do  not.  We  are 
pressing  forward  for  the  public  interests.  Men  must  stand  the  con- 
sequences of  their  errors,  and  pique  and  pride  can  no  more  control  the 
Mississippi  River  than  could  Canute,  by  waving  his  feeble  scepter, 
cause  the  tide  to  recede.  The  plain  Dutch  have  done  with  their  sea- 
works  what  his  majesty  could  not  achieve. 

Look  further  into  their  last  report.  You  find  estimates  for  various 
harbors  on  the  river,  aggregating  $2,014,000,  and  every  dollar  is  for 
revetment.  You  find  on  page  4 that  they  propose  a systematic  course 
of  revetment  for  the  bends  from  Cairo  down.  This  they  propose  to  do 


22 


and  to  let  the  river  scour  out  its  bars,  &c. , by  natural  agency,  aided 
only  by  revetment  instead  of  proceeding  in  the  line  of  nature’s  work. 
This  work,  as  is  clearly  deducible  from  their  estimates,  will  cost  at  the 
least  over  $130,000  a mile,  including  plant,  while  from  what  they  are 
now  trying  at  Memphis  I think  the  estimate  maybe  more  safely  put  at 
$30  a foot  than  at  $20,  if  it  is  to  be  carried  to  the  maximum  depth,  and 
we  have  scarcely  a hope  of  stability  short  of  that.  The  same  policy  is 
largely  practiced  in  the  reaches  under  treatment.  They  estimated  in 
1880  that,  say,  $1,250,000  would  complete  Providence  reach,  and  they 
have  now  spent,  say,  $2,000,000  on  it,  and  the  report  says  as  much  more 
is  required. 

For  Plum  Point  reach  they  estimated  less  than  $1,500,000,  and  they 
have  spent  over  $2,000,000  on  it,  with  the  intimation  of  spending  in  all 
$4,000,000,  with  no  limit  then  fixed.  For  one  of  the  commission  says, 
on  page  32,  that  they  will  spend  three  times  the  original  estimates  on 
these  reaches,  and  then  the  final  sum  is  undetermined.  The  Atchafa- 
laya  is  not  even  silled  yet,  and  to-day  the  whole  North  is  in  grave  dan- 
ger of  being  cut  off  from  the  Gulf,  and  New  Orleans  is  in  grave  danger 
of  being  cut  off  from  the  North.  All  this  is  the  result  of  deviations 
from  the  adopted  plan.  There  is  a grave  duty  for  us  to  discharge  here. 
Can  we  permit  this?  Is  there  a gentleman  here  who  ever  dreamed  of 
permitting  these  deviations  from  the  adopted  plan  for  treating  the 
river?  Can  we  countenance  them  for  a moment  by  look,  or  word,  or 
vote?  How  are  we  to  act  as  custodians  of  the  public  funds  and  of  this 
grand  river?  I expect  accidents.  I can  pardon  errors;  but  I can  not 
condone  this  radical,  fundamental,  foolish,  and  ruinous  change  of  policy. 

Gentlemen,  it  must  be  done  openly.  It  can  not  be  hid  in  a corner. 
The  plain  v^ay,  the  honest  way,  and  the  manly  way  is  the  only  way. 
We  must  rebuke  those  who  deserve  it.  We  must  in  every  way  merit 
the  confidence  of  the  country.  The  country  has  given  and  will  give 
freely  of  its  money.  They  ask  only  frankness  and  candor  of  us.  Can 
you  fail  to  stop  these  departures?  Can  you  ask  money  for  these 
wretched  experiments  ? Have  you  a particle  of  doubt  of  your  true 
plan  ? The  former  offers  untold  expense  and  no  results.  The  latter  is 
reasonable  in  amount  and  has  never  failed.  Where  contraction  has 
been  only  partially  completed  the  results  are  perfect  to  that  extent. 
Of  course,  enemies  to  the  West,  the  special  pleaders  of  Eastern  railroad 
corporations,  will  pervert  the  truth  and  seek  to  take  advantage  of  our 
candor  and  of  our  dilemma;  but  we  can  not  help  this,  and  they  can 
not  fool  the  House  or  the  people. 

This  is  the  condition  in  reports  and  from  observation.  We  must 
make  them  go  back  to  what  we  have  confidence  in.  They  must  stop 
this  ceaseless  revetting  and  first  remove  the  bars  which  are  the  chief 
cause  of  the  trouble.  You  never  find  a caving  bend  but  what  there  is 
a bar  above  it.  You  never  find  a caving  reach  but  what  there  is  a bar 
in  the  middle  and  a surplus  channel  to  be  closed. 

Mr.  ROSECRANS.  Will  the  gentleman  permit  an  interruption? 

Mr.  BRECKINRIDGE.  Pardon  me;  I have  only  a moment  left. 

The  statements  I make  are  plain  in  the  proof. 

[Here  the  hammer  fell.] 


© 


